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APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 10/616,351 07/09/2003 **Edward Enyedy** LEEE 2 00308 1545 27885 7590 06/14/2005 **EXAMINER** FAY, SHARPE, FAGAN, MINNICH & MCKEE, LLP LANGDON, EVAN H 1100 SUPERIOR AVENUE, SEVENTH FLOOR CLEVELAND, OH 44114 **ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER** 3654

DATE MAILED: 06/14/2005


Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

## **Advisory Action** Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief

Application No.	Applicant(s)	Applicant(s)		
10/616,351	ENYEDY, EDWARD	ENYEDY, EDWARD		
Examiner	Art Unit			
Evan H Langdon	3654			

•	Evan H Langdon	3654		
The MAILING DATE of this communication appe	ars on the cover sheet with the c	orrespondence add	ress	
THE REPLY FILED 28 April 2005 FAILS TO PLACE THIS APP	PLICATION IN CONDITION FOR A	LLOWANCE.		
<ol> <li>The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or o this application, applicant must timely file one of the folloplaces the application in condition for allowance; (2) a No (3) a Request for Continued Examination (RCE) in comp following time periods:</li> </ol>	n the same day as filing a Notice owing replies: (1) an amendment, a otice of Appeal (with appeal fee) in	f Appeal. To avoid ab ffidavit, or other evide compliance with 37 C	ence, which CFR 41.31; or	
a) $\square$ The period for reply expires $\underline{3}$ months from the mailing date of	the final rejection.			
b) The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this Advevent, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later the Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or (b). MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07(f)	an SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of ONLY CHECK BOX (b) WHEN THE FI	f the final rejection.		
Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date on which the petition under 37 CFR 1.136(a) and the appropriate extension fee have been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of extension and the corresponding amount of the fee. The appropriate extension fee under 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the shortened statutory period for reply originally set in the final Office action; or (2) as set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of the final rejection, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).  NOTICE OF APPEAL				
2. The Notice of Appeal was filed on A brief in com of filing the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any e Since a Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be a Notice of Appeal has been filed.	xtension thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)	), to avoid dismissal o	of the appeal.	
AMENDMENTS	h. Ai to the date of filling a bair	£		
3.  The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, but prior to the date of filing a brief, will <u>not</u> be entered because (a) They raise new issues that would require further consideration and/or search (see NOTE below); (b) They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE below);				
(c) They are not deemed to place the application in better form for appeal by materially reducing or simplifying the issues for				
appeal; and/or (d) They present additional claims without canceling a	corresponding number of finally re	ejected claims.		
NOTE: (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a))	·	•		
4. The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1. 5. Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s	121. See attached Notice of Non-C ):			
<ol> <li>Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be a the non-allowable claim(s).</li> </ol>	inowabie ii submitted in a separate	, timely filed amendin	ient canceling	
7.  For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a) how the new or amended claims would be rejected is pro The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows:	•	vill be entered and an	explanation of	
Claim(s) allowed: Claim(s) objected to:				
Claim(s) rejected: 1-24.		•		
Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration: <u>25</u> . AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE				
8. The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, because applicant failed to provide a showing of good ar and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e).	_			
9. The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessar	overcome <u>all</u> rejections under apperty and was not earlier presented.	eal and/or appellant fa See 37 CFR 41.33(d)(	ils to provide a 1).	
10. ☐ The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanation of the control of the contr	on of the status of the claims after	entry is below or attac	ched.	
11. The request for reconsideration has been considered by see attached.	ut does NOT place the application	in condition for allowa	ance because:	
12.  Note the attached Information Disclosure Statement(s).  13.  Other:		No(s) KATHY MAT SUPERVISORY PATE	atecke	
		KATHY MAT SUPERVISORY PATE	TECKI NT EXAMINER	

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continued from 11.

Claims 1 and 12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(b) as being anticipated by Kokaji. Claims 1 and 6 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(b) as being anticipated by McBride. The additional limitation "on a wire feeding mechanism" in addition to the preamble is still considered a suggested use of the device.

Claims 2-5 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kokaji. Claims 7-8 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over McBride in view of Kokaji. Claims 1-5, 9-18, 22-24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ullman in view of Kokaji. Claims 6-8, 19-21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ullman in view Kokaji and McBride.

In response to the Applicant's argument that Kokaji is nonanalogous art, it has been held that the determination that a reference is from a nonanalogous art is twofold. First, we decide if the reference is within the field of the inventor's endeavor. If it is not, we proceed to determine whether the reference is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor was involved. In regards to claim Wood, 202 USPQ 171, 174. In this case, the drive roller of Kokaji is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor was involved i.e. drive rollers plated to make the roller harder to withstand wear.

In response to the Applicant's argument that there is no suggestion to combine the references, the Examiner recognizes that the references cannot be arbitrarily combined and that there must be some reason why one skilled in the art would be motivated to make the proposed combination of primary and secondary references. In re Nomiya, 184 USPQ 607 (CCPA 1975). However, there is no requirement that a motivation to make the modification be expressly articulated. The test for combining references is what the combination of the disclosure taken as a whole would suggest to one of ordinary skill in the art. In re McLaughlin, 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1971). References are evaluated by what they suggest to one versed in the art, rather then by their specific disclosures. In re Bozek, 163 USPQ 545 (CCPA 1969). In this case, Kokaji is relied upon to teach a drive roller plated to prevent damage and prolong life.

In response to the Applicant's argument that the Examiner's conclusion of obviousness is based upon improper hindsight reasoning, it must be recognized that any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning. But so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level or ordinary skill at the time the intention was made, and does not include knowledge gleaned only from the applicant's disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper. In re McLaughlin, 443 F. 2d 1992; 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1971).